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[So 11'. No. 21082.

In Bank.

Oct. 9, 1962.]

ANNE S. AMEN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MERCED
COUNTY TITLE COMPANY et al., Defendants and
Respondents.

)

[la,lb] Escrows--Remedies--Statute of Limitations.-An action
against an escrow holder based on breach of the instructions to
defendant providing that any debts over a specified amount to
be assumed by plaintiff would be paid by the escrow holder out
of the sale proceeds and that the escrow was accepted by
defendant subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the
instructions and on breach of an implied promise of the escrow
holder to inform plaintiff of the necessity of obtaining a sales
tax clearance certificate in order to avoid a successor's liability
for such taxes was one based on a written contract, was governed by the four-year statute of limitations (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 337) and was thus not barred for having been commenced
more than two years after defendant allegedly failed to inform
plaintiff of the potential tax liability. (Disapproving Shumaker:
v. Rippy, 138 Cal.App.2d 815, 816 [292 P.2d 536] and Howard
v. Security Title Ins. tI; Guar. Co., 20 Cal.App.2d 226, 228-229
[66 P.2d 1247] insofar as they are inconsistent with the views
expressed in this case.)
[1] See Ca.l.Jur.2d, Escrows, § 36; Am.Jur., Escrows (1st ed § 31
et seq).
McX:. Dig. References: [1,3,5,10] Escrows, § 23; [2,4] Escrow!!,
§ 15; [6-9] Limitation of Actions, § 33.
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[2] Id.-Duties of Depositary.-An escrow holder must comply
strictly with the instructions of the parties.
[3] Id.-Remedies-Breach of Contract.-On an escrow holder's
breach of an instruction that it has contracted to perform or of
an implied promise arising out of the agreement with the buyer
or seller, the injured party acquires a cause of action for brench
of contract.
[4] Id.-Liabilities of Depositary.-If an escrow holder acts negligently, it is ordinarily liable for nny loss occnsioned by its
breach of duty.
[5] Id.-Remedies-Statute of Limitations.-If escrow instructions are in writing and the escrow holder accepts them or if
the escrow holder prepares the instructions, offers to perform
them, and the buyer and seller accept the offer, an action for
failure to comply with the instructions is on a written contract.
The contract may be "in writing" for the purposes of the statute of limitations although it was accepted orally or by an
act other than signing.
[6] Limitation of Actions-Period of Limitation-Instruments in
Writing.-An action is on a written contract though it is
based on a promise implied from the writing.
(7] Id.-Period of Limitation-Instruments in Writing.-A longer
period of limitations is npplied to actions on written contracts
than to actions on oral contracts, since the writing is clear
evidence in permanent form of the terms of the agreement.
[8] Id.-Period of Limitation-Instruments in Writing.-When a
pnrty has agreed to a writing, there is no reason to invoke the
two-year statute of limitations applicable to oral agreements.
The four-year statute of limitations, unlike the statute of
frauds, does not require that the writing be signed by the
party to be charged.
[9] Id.-Period of Limitation-Instruments in Writing.-Had the
Legislature meant to make a signature mandatory for a writing
to qualify for the four-year statute of limitations it would have
so provided as it did in Code Civ. Proc., § 360, which requires
that a new promise to perform under an old contract be signed
to start the statute running anew .
•
[10] Escrows - Remedies - Statute of Limitations. - Even if an
action against an escrow holder for damages resulting from the
escrow holder's failure to notify plaintiff buyer of the need to
obtain a sales tax clearance certificate to avoid a successor's
liability for such tax was not based on a written contract but
[6] What constitutes a contract in writing within statute of
limitations, note, 3 A.L.R.2d 809. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Limitation of
Actions, §§ 36,68,76; Am.Jur. Limitation of Actions (1st ed § 80).
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fell within the two-year statute of limitations (Code Civ.
Proc., § 339), that statute would not begin to run against
plaintiff until she knew or shoulU have known the facts that
constituted the breach of the escrow holder's duty; thus,
allegations that she was never informed of the communications
between defendant and the State Board of Equalization concerning the potential tax liability and that notice of tax liability was sent to her for the first time on a date within two
years of the commencement (If the action were sufficient to
allege that plaintiff discovered or was put on notice of defendant's breach on that date and were sufficient to overcome a
demurrer based on the statute of limitations.

APPEAL from a judgment of. the Superior Court of Merced County. R. R. Sischo, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Action for breach of an escrow contract and for negligence.
Judgment of dismissal after demurrers to amended complaint
were sustained without leave to amend, affirmed as to some
defendants and otherwise reversed.

)

T. N. Petersen and Guernsey Carson for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Preston, Braucht & George and H. C. George for Defendants
and Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered after the sustaining of defendants' demurrers
to her amended complaint without leave to amend. Her first
cause of action alleged that defendant Merced County Title
Company breached a contract with her to act as escrow holder.
Her second cause of action, based on negligence, alleged the
same acts and omissions as did the first.The amended complaint alleges that on April 2, 1958, plaintiff and her husband entered into a written contract to purchase a tavEU"n. The contract, in the form of escrow instructions, was typed on forms provided by defendant and was
signed by the sellers and by plaintiff and her husband. The
initials of D. M. Guest, defendant's agent, were typed at the
top of the form. The purchase price of $74,300 was to be paid
$10,000 in cash, $54,300 by a note and deed of trust, and
*The third cause of action against Western Title Insurance and Guaranty Company to which the trial court also sustained a demurrer is not
involved in this appeal.
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$10,000 by the buyers' assumption of certain debts. The
instructions to llefendallt stated that: "Any debts over
$10,000 will be paid by the Mcrced County Title Company out
of the proceeds of the salc" and that ". . . this escrow is
acccpted by your company [defendant] subject to all terms
and cond itions set forth herein and printed on the back hereof,
which terms, conditions and the instructions given herein have
been rca(l by and agl'ced to by all parties signing these escrow
instructions. "
On April 14, 1958, before the escrow closed, the State Board
of Equalization mailed to plaintiff in care of defendant a
notice that plaintiff should obtain a tax clearance certificate
to ayoid liability fot' statc sales taxes owed by the seller. (Sce
Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 6811, 6812.) One of the board's auditors
also callcd Guest on the telephone, repeated the warning, and
asked whether a certificate would be requested. Guest replied
that it would not. Plaintiff was never informed of the written
notice or of the telephone conversation; no certificate was
requested, and on June 26,1938, the escrow closed. The sellers
failed to pay the sales taxes, which amounted to $4,749.84, and
on October 31, 1959, plaintiff received notice of her liability
to the state as Sllcc('ssor to the sellers. Six days later the state
filed a lien for the taxes due, Since plaintiff had already
assumed $10,000 of the debts of the business, she ultimately
found herself with a liability of $14,749.84 despite the fact
that she had instructed defendant to pay debts exceeding
$10,000 out of the proceeds.
Plaintiff did not file her complaint until July 29, 1960, more
than two years after defendant allegedly breached an express
provision of its contract and an implied promise to inform her
of the potential tax liability. The trial court sustained the
demurrer apparently on the ground that the two-year statute
of limitations applicable to "[a] n action upon a contract,
obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument of
writing . . . " barred plaintiff's action. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 339.) [1a] Plaintiff contends, however, that her action
was on a '~ritten contract, that the four-year statute of limitations therefore applies (Code Civ. Proc., § 337), and that
in any event, the statute did not begin to run until October 31,
1959, when she first received notice of the state's lien.
[2] An escrow holder must comply strictly with the instructions of the parties. (Rianda v. San Benito Title G-uar.
00., 35 Cal.2d 170, 173 [217 P.2d 25] ; Shreeves v. Pearson,
194 Cal. 699, 711 [230 P. 448] ; Dawson v. Bank of America,
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100 Cal.App.2d 305, 309 [223 P.2d 280J.) [3] Upon the
escrow holder's breach of an instruction that it has contracted
to perform or of an implied promise arising out of the agreement with the buyer or seller, the injured party acquires a
cause of action for breach of contract. (See Francis v. Eisel!mayer. 171 Cal.App.2d 221, 225-227 [340 P.2d 54] ; Han'as Y.
Titlc Ins. &- Guar. Co., 118 Cal.App.2cl 659, 665-666 [258 P.2(1
866) ; Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Clcary, 319 Ill.App. 83 (48
N.E.2d 576,578) ; Rest. 2d Agency, § 14 D, com. a.) [4] Similarly, if the escrow holder acts negligently, "it would ordinarily be liable for any loss occasioned by its breach of duty."
(Rial/do, v. San Bcm:{o Title GUaI·. Co., supra; [[al'ras v. Title
Ins. &; Guar. Co., supra; see Rest. 2d Agency, §§ 399(b), 401.)
[ 5 ] If the escrow instructions are in writing and the escrow
holder accepts them or if the escro,v holder prepares the
instructions, offers to perform them, and the buyer and seller
accept the offer, an action for failure to comply with the
instructions is on a written contract. The contract may be
"in writing" for purposes of the statute of limitations even
though it was accepted orally or by an act other than signing.
(Cleveland Trust Co. v. Elbrechf. 137 Ohio St. 3;;8 [30 N.E.2d
433, 436] ; McCormick v. Taft, 61 Ohio App. 200 [22 N.E.2d
510) ; Fey v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 147 Kan. 31 [75 P.2d
810, 812-813] ; First Nat. Bank of Berwyn v. Raymer, 180
Okla. 529 [71 P.2d 485, 487-488J ; Atlanta K. & N. Ry. Co. v.
McKinney, 124 Ga. 929 [53 S.E. 701. 704, 6 L.R.A. N.S. 436,
110 Alll.St.Rep. 215J ; Schmucker v. Sibcrt, 18 Kan. 104, 111
[26 Am.St.Rep. 765] ; see 38 Mich. L. Rev. 257, 258; 1 Corbin
on Contracts, § 31 at pp. 84-86; cf. Remsberg v. Hackney Mfg.
Co., 174 Cal. 799 [164 P. 792J ; Califor'nia Jewelry Co. v. Provident Loan Assn., 6 Cal.App.2d 506, 510-511 [45 P.2d 271].)
[6] An action is on a written contract, even though it is
based on a promise implied from the writing. (See Comunale v.
Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal.2d 654, 662 [328 P.2d
198] ; Lawrence Barker, Inc. v. Briggs, 39 Cal.2d 654, 661 [248
P.2d 897) ;' Simmons v. Birge Co., 52 F.Supp. 629, 633-634;
Indian Turitory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Rosamond, 190 Oida.
46 [120 P.2d 349. 354, 138 A.L.R. 246] ; Home Ins. Co. v.
Mercantile Trust Co., 219 Mo.App. 645 [284 S.W. 834, 835836] ; 1 Corbin on Contracts, § 31 at p. 84; but see Grant v.
Williams, 158 Neb. 107 [62 N.W.2d 532, 536J.)
[7] A longer period of limitations applies to actions on
written contracts than to actions on oral contracts, since the
writing is clear evidence in permanent form of the terms of
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the agrN.'Ill('ut. (See Homire v. Stratton d: Terstegge Co., 157
Ky. 822 [164 S.W. 67, 69]; 38 Mich. L. Rev. 257, 259.)
[8] When a party has agt'ced to the writing, there is no
reason to invoke the two-year statute of limitations applicable
to oral agreements. The four-year statute of limitations, unlike
the statute of frauds, does not require that the writing be
signed by the party to be charged. [9] Had the Legislature
meant to make a signature mandatory for a writing to qualify
for the longer period of limitations it would have so provided
as it did in section 360 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
requires that a new promise to perform under an 010. contract
be signed to start the statute running anew. [1 b] Plaintiff's action was therefore on a written contract.
Defendant invokes Shumaker v. Rippy, 138 Cal.App.2d 815,
816 l292 P.2d 536], in which the court held that "The twoyear statute of limitations . . . is applicable either to an
action for breach of an escrow agreement or to an action for
damages on aecount of negligence in the performance thereof." Similar holdings appear in Roberts v. Carter ~ Potruch,
140 Cal.App.2d 370, 373 [295 P.2d 515], and in Howard v.
Security Title Ins. ~ Guar. Co., 20 Cal.App.2d 226, 228-229
[66 P.2d 1247]. (But see Simmons v. Bank of America, 159
Cal.App.2d 566, 569 [323 P.2d 1043].) In the Roberts case,
however, the instructions to the escrow holder were oral. In
the HOWQ1'd case the court rejected the plaintiff's contention
that an action based on the violation of escrow instructions was
on a written contract and viewed the cause of action as one
for negligence. (Howard v. Security Title Ins. ~ Quar. Co.,
supra, at p. 229.) The holdings in the Shumaker and Howard
cases appear to be based upon a misreading of Lattin v. Gillette, 95 Cal. 317 [30 P. 545, 29 Am.St.Rep. 115]. Therc this
court held that when the defendants were employed to search
the title of certain premises and made a rQPort that included
a written certificate that title was vested in one Birnbaum,
free of encumbrances, c, [t] he written certificate ... although
an instrument in writing, is not an instrument upon which
{defendants'] liability is founded." (Id. at p. 322.) In the
Lattin case the contract of employment was oral and the title
report was mere clevidence relied upon by [plaintiff] to establish the breach of ... contract.... " (Id. at p. 323.) In the
Shumaker and Howard cases, however, it was alleged that the
escrow holder had breached an actual or implied provision
of a written contract. Although in both these cases the writing
was a memorandum of the agreement between the buyer and
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the seller, it was also a written memorandum of the contract
betwecn the escrow holder ana the parties to the sale contract.
To the extent that the Slmmaker and Howard cases are inconsistent with the 'views expressed herein, they are disapproved.
[10] Even if plaintiff's action were not based on a written contractl the statnte wonld not run against her nntil she
knew or should have known the facts that constituted the
breach of defendant's duty. In the absence of a special
dcmurrer on the ground. that plaintiff did not specifically
allege when she discovered defendant's breach, her allegations
that she was never informed of the communications between
defendant and the State Board of Equalization and that notice
of the tax liability was sent to ber for the first time on October
31, 1959, were sufficient. to allege that she discovered or was
put 011 notice of defendant's breach 011 that date. It was suffi('ient to overeome a demurrer based on the statute of limitations that she alleged an injury that would ordinarily escape
her discovery and discovery within the statutory period, that
defendant was an escrow holder (and hence was a fiduciary,
see e.g., In re Chrisman, 35 F.Supp. 282, 285), and facts
showing that her ignorance of the breach was justifiable. (See
J(ane v. Coo1.·, 8 Cal. 449, 438; Rafter v. HllI"Cl,136 Kan. 127 [12
P.2d 837,839] ; Dawson, Undiscovered Fraud and Statutes 0/
Limitation, 31 Mich. L. Rev. 591, 607-613; Dawson, Fraudulent Concealmellt and Statutes of Limitation, 31 Mich. L. Rev.
875,887-893; 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177, 1214-1217; 6 W~lliston on
Contracts (rev. ed.) § 2033, at p. 5703.) Cases in which the
defendant stands in a fiduciary relationship to the plaintiff
are frequently treated as if they involved fraudulent conceal.
ment of the cause of action by the defendant. The theory is
that although the defendant makes no active misrepresentation, this element "is supplied by an affirmative obligation to
make full disclosure, and the non-disclosure itself is 'fraud.' "
(Dawson, FrauduZent Concealment and Statutes 0/ Limitation, supra. at }l. 887; sec Krzne v. Cook, Sllp"a; Frazier v.
Frazier, 211 Ala. 176 [100 So. 118, 119-120] ; Boon v. Root,
131 Wis. 451 [19 N.W. 121, 122-123] ; Bent v. Priest, 86 Mo.
475,488-489; Kelley v. Nealley, 76 Me. 71, 74; Batts v. Winstead, 77 N.C. 238; Hoyle v. Jones, 35 Ga. 40, 43-44 [89 Am.
Dec. 273] ; 51 lIarv. L. RI.'Y. 1300. 1301; 43 Harv. L. Rev. 471.)
There is no need to resort to this fiction, however, for the very
existence of a fiduciary relationship obviated the necessity of
plaintiff's pleading fraud. (Rafter v. lIurd, S1tpra, at p. 839;
see Dawson, Undiscovered Fraud and Statutes of Limitation,
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supra, at pp. 610-621; 1 Mechem, Agency (2d ed.) § 1347 at
pp. 984-986.) If, as plaintiff alleged, defendant breached its
fiduciary duty to disclose her potential liability for the unpaid
sales taxes, it would be manifestly unjust to hold that her
action was barred by the statute of limitations when her
failure to file a timely complaint resulted from that brl'ach.
The judgment is affirmed as to defendants Western Title
Insurance Company and William S. Fisher, its agent. In all
other respects the judgment is reversed.

Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Tobriner, J., concurred.
Schauer, J., and McComb, J. concurred in the judgment.
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